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Abstract
This paper addresses the relationship between compliance with social performance crite-
ria (the social outcomes that must be achieved for certification) and procedural (manage-
ment) criteria and this relationship’s significance for social equity at both farm and wider 
landscape levels. We consider social performance compliance to be pertinent to farm-level 
equity, and the relative compliance of small versus large farms to be pertinent to landscape-
level equity. Certification’s management requirements are often deemed disproportionately 
burdensome for small, resource-poor producers, and hence a barrier to landscape-level 
equity. There is a lack of research examining how management criteria impact the ability of 
different sized farms to meet certification’s social performance requirements. We analysed 
435 certification audits, covering all Brazilian coffee farms that sought Rainforest Alliance 
certification from 2006 to 2014 inclusive: 80 individual farms and 23 groups of farms. In 
principle, undergoing group certification permits smallholders to benefit from economies 
of scale. Our analysis revealed a statistically significant, positive correlation between com-
pliance with procedural (managing sustainability plans) and social performance criteria. 
This correlation was stronger for groups than individual farms. Group farms’ compliance 
was statistically equivalent to that of individual farms, suggesting that group certification is 
achieving its intended purpose of socio-economic levelling of certified farmers. Over time, 
certified farms’ average compliances improved. Our findings suggest that management 
requirements play an important role in improving smallholders’ overall social sustainabil-
ity performance and that group certification may help resource-poor smallholders achieve 
those requirements. Further work is required to understand causal mechanisms underlying 
the relationships we present.
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1 Introduction
1.1  Certification and social equity
The core logic of sustainability certification is to promote responsible production by 
verifying that products are produced in accordance with agreed upon environmental and 
social requirements. The social aspirations of certification, in particular, have prompted 
critiques of how effectively certification itself delivers social equity, i.e. fairness in pro-
cesses of decision-making and distribution of benefits, costs, and risks (McDermott 2013; 
Pinto et al. 2014; Kalonga et al. 2015). There is a growing body of research on sustain-
ability certification’s impacts on social equity (e.g. Durst et al. 2006; Alemagi et al. 2012; 
Foley and McCay 2014; Kalonga et al. 2015; Tysiachniouk and McDermott 2016; Bullock 
et al. 2018) and for small-scale producers (Bolwig et al. 2009; Loconto and Dankers 2014; 
DeFries et al. 2017).
Coffee has been a particularly vibrant sector for social and environmental certification 
and is indicative of the rising prominence of trans-national private governance of global 
trade (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005; Auld 2010; Gereffi 2014). Coffee—the world’s second 
most traded commodity by value (Ogden et al. 2013; Tucker 2017)—was one of the first 
crops to be targeted for sustainability certification, and the world market share of sustain-
able coffee adhering to social, environmental, and economic standards has grown rapidly 
in recent years (Panhuysen and Pierrot 2014; Oya et  al. 2017; Tayleur et  al. 2017). The 
original motivations for certifying coffee production were social in nature, with pioneer-
ing labels such as Max Havelaar and FairTrade aiming to give farmers a fair price and 
improved access to foreign buyers (Giovannucci and Koekoek 2003; Tayleur et al. 2017). 
Other certification programmes, including the Rainforest Alliance’s (RA’s) Sustainable 
Agriculture Network (SAN), were driven primarily by non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), with a broader mandate to incorporate both environmental and social concerns 
(Sasser 2003; Cashore et al. 2004; Auld et al. 2008; Kolk 2013). Nevertheless, across all 
certification schemes, the way in which earnings from the lucrative coffee crop are distrib-
uted along the supply chain is the subject of much contestation (Dicum and Luttinger 1999; 
Charveriat 2001; Gresser and Tickell 2002; Talbot 2004; Raynolds et al. 2007; Raynolds 
2009; Pinto et al. 2014).
Equity has been a particularly strong focus of research within the coffee sector (Bray 
et  al. 2002; Raynolds 2002; Bacon 2008; Lyon et  al. 2010). Possible reasons for this 
equity focus include the major role that smallholders play in coffee production worldwide 
(Charveriat 2001; Gresser and Tickell 2002; IBGE 2006; Potts et al. 2014); the volatility 
of global coffee prices and associated labour market insecurity (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 
1994; Ponte and Gibbon 2005; Malan 2013; Kolk 2013; Jena et al. 2017); and the narrow 
share of profits allocated to farmers in the sector (e.g. Raynolds et al. 2007; Bacon 2008; 
Beuchelt and Zeller 2011; Rueda and Lambin 2013, etc.). As a result, it is important to 
understand where, when, and for whom coffee certification is burdensome or unattainable, 
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and how this may relate to social outcomes and thus equitable economic development. At 
the producer level, researchers have debated the balance between certification’s social ben-
efits, especially for workers and communities, and its costs, particularly for certified small-
holders (e.g. Barbosa de Lima et al. 2009; Arnould et al. 2009; Bolwig et al. 2009; Preißel 
and Reckling 2010; Blackman and Rivera 2010).
1.2  Brazilian coffee and SAN/RA group certification
In Brazil—the world’s primary supplier of both coffee (producing around one-third of the 
world’s coffee) and of certified coffee beans (Potts et al. 2014)—the majority of coffee pro-
ducers are smallholders (Watson and Achinelli 2008; Saes 2008), with an estimated 85% 
of Brazilian coffee farmers holding and cultivating less than 50  ha (IBGE 2006, 2013). 
These smallholders face difficulties accessing the financial resources to undergo certifica-
tion (Nordlund and Egelyng 2008; Pinto et al. 2014). Despite Brazil’s economic leadership 
in agricultural commodities production (Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2012; Lapola et  al. 
2014) sustainability issues such as deforestation, pesticide use, hazardous work, and poor 
labour conditions have been common challenges for Brazilian agriculture (Kruger 2007; 
Nepstad et al. 2009; Martinelli et al. 2010).
The SAN standard addresses these challenges through both its criteria that prescribe 
improved (1) environmental and (2) social performance, as well as (3) through its man-
agement criteria that outline what is needed to adequately plan for and monitor improved 
socio-environmental performance. At the core of the management criteria is the require-
ment for a farm management system that integrates the agronomic, operational, environ-
mental, and social dimensions of production (SAN 2011a).
At the landscape level, concerns have been raised that the high costs of certification 
favour large producers, and that insufficient numbers of resource-poor smallholders have 
been certified across both farm and forest landscapes (e.g. Renard 2005; Raynolds et  al. 
2007; McDermott 2013; Handschuch et  al. 2013; Nelson and Phillips 2018). While the 
focus of the SAN standard is on improving on-farm management, its broader mission is to 
promote sustainability at a larger, landscape level.
The SAN developed the concept of “group certification” in 2008 as a means to increase 
smallholder participation through economies of scale (Milder et  al. 2010; McDermott 
2013; Hidayat et al. 2015; Kissinger et al. 2014). A study of SAN/RA-certified coffee in 
Brazil indicated that group certification is at least partially fulfilling this goal of increasing 
smallholder access to certification since more small- and medium-scale producers receive 
group certification than individual certification (Pinto et al. 2014). Indeed, in 2013, certi-
fied coffee groups in Brazil were responsible for almost half of the volume of SAN/RA-
certified coffee (Pinto 2014).
Group certification requires, firstly, that farmers organise themselves into a formal and 
legally recognised producer group, such as a cooperative (ISEAL 2008). Group certifica-
tion functions as an internal quality system (Fouilleux and Loconto 2017), whereby a des-
ignated group leader prepares the group for a later external audit on the group’s overall 
levels of compliance. The group is responsible for ensuring that all of its members com-
ply with the criteria, which makes for a more challenging auditing process, burdening a 
group’s leaders with significant responsibilities (Mutersbaugh 2002; Winters et al. 2015). 
Every year, a farm group must be audited for at least 2 days by at least two auditors (SAN 
2011a, v. 3).
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Apart from the lack of financial resources, another core issue relevant to certification 
equity is the difficulty smallholders experience complying with procedural requirements 
(Durst et  al. 2006; Alemagi et  al. 2012; Bakker 2014)—or, as we shall refer to them in 
this paper, management requirements. Typically these resource-poor producers do not 
have adequate means to adapt to new management requirements (Plouffe et al. 2011), i.e. 
requirements that focus on plans and procedures to achieve or verify desired outcomes, 
but do not directly deliver substantive sustainability outcomes (Cashore 1997; Blowfield, 
1999; Elliott, 2000; McDermott et al. 2010). Thus, from the perspectives of social equity 
and development outcomes, it is critical to consider which certification criteria are associ-
ated with achieving high social performance (the social outcomes that must be achieved 
for certification, such as good community relations, responsible labour practices, health, 
education), and how this may vary by farm type and size.
1.3  Focus of this paper
This paper returns to certified coffee’s social justice origins by focusing on the SAN stand-
ard used to certify coffee farms in Brazil.
Many agricultural certification standards—such as FairTrade, Utz, and Organic—have 
converged by combining what we label “management” (procedural) and “social” (perfor-
mance) criteria (Turcotte et al. 2014). The SAN/RA standard contains comprehensive pro-
cedural and performance requirements based on social issues (Potts et al. 2014, Table 3.8). 
In this study we examine compliance with management criteria and social performance 
criteria, and the relationship between the two, in order to gain insight into some of the 
challenges associated with certification compliance and attainment, particularly from a 
social equity perspective.1 (We study management requirements set out in the written SAN 
standard, and not those associated with the process of certification auditing or verification; 
consideration of such process requirements is beyond the scope of this study and merits 
additional research.)
To gain insight into the roles of procedural- and performance-based standards (Blow-
field 1999; Cashore et al. 2004; Gulbrandsen 2005, 2010; McDermott et al. 2008) in the 
context of achieving social equity through certification, we investigate which are the most 
prevalent non-compliances with SAN/RA’s procedural management and social perfor-
mance criteria and assess whether compliance with social performance criteria appears 
to increase with compliance with management criteria. This analysis of non-compliance 
builds upon a number of previous studies, primarily in the forest sector which found by and 
large, certified companies have had to make more changes pertaining to their documenta-
tion and monitoring rather than to on-the-ground practices (Gulbrandsen 2005; Newsom 
et  al. 2006; Auld et  al. 2008, Sect.  3.3). Similarly, a study by Rametsteiner and Simula 
(2003, p. 95) commented that improvements were mainly with “internal auditing and mon-
itoring”. However, to date, little research has been done to assess the correlation between 
certification’s management requirements and socio-environmental performance.
In the literature there is a dearth of analyses on audits, with a few exceptions (e.g. 
Locke et al. 2007; Distelhorst et al. 2015; Toffel et al. 2015). Our study is based exclu-
sively on audit data so fills this gap in the literature, and to our knowledge, this is the 
first study to analyse such a large certification dataset for any agricultural commodity. 
1 We defer environmental considerations to a separate study.
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Furthermore, this study takes a landscape-level approach by assessing all Brazil-
ian coffee farms that sought SAN/RA certification from 2006 to 2014. Our sample, 
therefore, provides a complete picture of compliance across all farm sizes and types. 
To explore landscape-level equity, we compare the compliance results for individual 
and group certified farms. We also assess whether compliance is related to the size 
of an individual farm, i.e. whether larger farms comply less or more, on average, than 
smaller farms. Lastly, we study trends in compliance over time to understand more 
about farms’ performance with each annual audit, in part because the standard becomes 
more demanding over time with the addition of new rules and new critical criteria.
2  Materials and methods
Evidence as to whether certification achieves its intended sustainability objectives is 
mixed (Blackman and Rivera 2011; Loconto and Dankers 2014; van Rijsbergen et al. 
2016) and lacking in rigour (Oya et  al. 2017; DeFries et  al. 2017; Nelson and Phil-
lips 2018). The lack of large-scale assessments of sustainability certification’s impacts 
could be impeding improvements to the standards (Milder et  al. 2012; Milder et  al. 
2015) and could be contributing to fragmented policy messages (Newton et al. 2013). 
Therefore, we propose and develop a systematic and scalable approach to evaluate 
the impacts of the SAN standard. Better evidence on impacts, and across longer time 
frames, could position certification standards as “powerful adaptive management” 
frameworks which could support sustainability efforts more widely (Milder et al. 2015, 
p. 312).
Our analysis, at its core, is based on the issuance of non-compliances during audits. 
Non-compliances are issued by accredited auditors of the certifying body in the course 
of their certification assessments to indicate non-compliance with the SAN standards’ 
criteria and to define the steps that certified operations must take to achieve future 
compliance. Non-compliances may be “major” or “minor” depending on their signifi-
cance. An analysis of non-compliances can be used to compare performance across 
criteria and between producer types. Since certified operations are audited annually, 
an analysis of major and minor non-compliances can also be used to assess reported 
changes in performance over time. Farms, whether certified as groups or as individu-
als, need to achieve a minimum of 80% compliance with the SAN criteria, for each 
annual audit (SAN 2011a, b). Farms that achieve at least 80% compliance—and more-
over, comply with every so-called critical criterion (see “Appendix”)—are awarded 
the Rainforest Alliance Certified™ seal.
All the audit data used in this study were provided by IMAFLORA. Until December 
2014, IMAFLORA was the only certification body in Brazil accredited by the SAN and 
RA to verify that farms comply with SAN standards; therefore, our data cover every 
Brazilian coffee farm that sought SAN/RA certification from 2006 to 2014, inclusive. 
IMAFLORA has recorded all the non-compliances on the farms they have audited 
from 2003 until the end of 2014. These audit results have been complete since 2006. 
(The audit results from 2003 to 2005 were not recorded systematically.) This complete 
recording of farm non-compliances across 9 years represented a unique opportunity for 
a rigorous and quantitative analysis of the non-compliances, including a time-series 
analysis of non-compliance trends.
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2.1  Classifying social and management criteria
We classified the management and social performance criteria of the SAN standard in con-
sultation with practicing auditors of the SAN standard at IMAFLORA Brazil. Manage-
ment criteria are those which require farmers to adhere to procedures, usually by way of 
implementing management systems, planning, and record-keeping. For a farm to prepare 
for a SAN/RA audit, certain procedures and protocol need to be adopted that integrates the 
agronomic, operational, environmental, and social dimensions of production (SAN 2011a). 
To comply with the certification criteria, many farms need to initiate a new system for 
measuring and monitoring their performance. The management criteria, listed as the SAN 
two-tier numbering system, are the following: 1.1; 1.2; 1.3; 1.4; 1.5; 1.6; 1.7; 1.8; 1.9; 2.1; 
2.9; 4.1; 4.6; 5.1; 5.4; 6.1; 6.2; 6.18; 7.2; 8.1; 9.1; 9.2; 10.1; refer to “Appendix” and/or 
SAN (2011a) for more details on these criteria. These management criteria comprise most 
of the criteria in Principle 1 of the SAN standard (SAN’s management system), as well as 
those criteria related to management across SAN’s other nine principles.
Social performance-based criteria are those which address desired social outcomes, 
such as livelihood guarantees, fair labour practices, community relations, health, potable 
water, education, and raising environmental awareness. In tandem with auditing practition-
ers, we grouped all the SAN criteria that pertained to socially sustainable outcomes. The 
SAN standard is designed to improve social outcomes on farms with more than one-third 
of SAN’s criteria being social in nature. There is broad agreement among actors that the 
social criteria with which farms must comply in order to achieve the SAN/RA certifica-
tion are stringent (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005; Raynolds et al. 2007; Newton et al. 2013; 
Englund and Berndes 2015). SAN’s social performance criteria are as follows: 5.2; 5.3; 
5.5; 5.6; 5.7; 5.8; 5.10; 5.11; 5.12; 5.13; 5.14; 5.15; 5.16; 5.17; 5.18; 6.3; 6.4; 6.5; 6.6; 
6.7; 6.8; 6.9; 6.10; 6.11; 6.12; 6.13; 6.14; 6.15; 6.16; 6.17; 6.19; 7.1; 7.3; 7.4; 7.5; 7.6; as 
before, more details on these criteria may be found in “Appendix” and/or SAN (2011a). 
These social performance criteria comprise most of the criteria of principles 5, 6, and 7 
(referring to labour, occupational health and safety, and wider community relations, respec-
tively) except those previously classified as management.
2.2  Stratification by group and individual farms
Pinto et al.’s (2014) study of SAN/RA-certified coffee in Brazil found that there are a larger 
number of small-sized producers that receive group rather than individual certification. 
Since group certification was developed by SAN to increase smallholders’ participation in 
certification, we stratify our analysis to distinguish between individual- and group-certified 
farms. We then consider the findings on compliance with social criteria for group certifica-
tions as particularly relevant to smallholders.
Beyond the binary farm profile category of whether a farm was a group farm or an 
individual farm, building on Pinto et al.’s (2014) we also wanted to know how diverse 
farm sizes could increase social equity across Brazil’s SAN-certified coffee landscape. 
Therefore, we conducted another, supplementary analysis on farm size. Three area 
variables—total area, production area, and protected area—were recorded in the IMA-
FLORA data. Protected area, as defined by the SAN standard and also by Brazil’s For-
est Code, is the land that is under protection to conserve biodiversity or environmental 
services; production area is the land that is used for the cultivation of coffee. We only 
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performed this analysis for individual farms, since the interpretation of recorded areas 
for farm groups was not straightforward: for example, “500 ha” could have been the 
result of ten farms of 50 ha each, or two farms of 100 ha and ten farm of around 30 ha, 
etc., allowing infinitely many different combinations. With farm groups, the areas of 
individual member farms were not recorded in the audit data. Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting—especially given our later discussion of the role of group certification in land-
scape-level equity—that certified groups of farms are known to span diverse area dis-
tributions (e.g. a mix of smaller and larger farms vs. many similar-sized farms) and to 
range in number from as few as four member farms to more than forty member farms 
(Pinto et al. 2014, Table 2).
2.3  Data and analysis
We wrote a series of computer scripts using the MATLAB programming language to 
process the available data and compute the following, for both individual farms and 
farm groups:
1. for each audit (one farm or farm group, 1 year), a “social non-compliance score”; and
2. for each audit (one farm or farm group, 1 year), a “management non-compliance score”.
In Sect.  2.1 we listed the criteria we deemed (based on consultations with SAN 
standard auditors) to fall on the axes of (1) management and (2) social performance. 
In order to attach more weight to major non-compliances, we, in adherence to the SAN 
policy (SAN 2011a, v. 3), penalised each farm 1 point for each major non-compliance, 
and only 0.5 points for a minor non-compliance. Thus, for example, a farm found to 
have three major and two minor social non-compliances would end up with an aggre-
gated social non-compliance score of 4 points, while a farm found to have five minor 
social non-compliances would end up with an aggregated management non-compliance 
score of 2.5 points (2.5 points being “better” than 4 in the sense that it encapsulates 
lower overall non-compliance). The relative weights attached to major and minor non-
compliances (in a ratio of 2:1) are mathematically consistent with the ranges chosen to 
represent major versus minor (0–49% vs. 50–99%) non-compliances. This weighting 
is also the same one used by SAN auditors to calculate their aggregated performance 
scores that span all possible criteria from the audit.
Thus, we ended up with:
• 367 social and 367 management scores for individual farms (from 9 years’ worth of 
data, for 80 farms)
• 68 social and 68 management scores for farm groups (from 6 years’ worth of data, 
for 23 groups)
We then wrote further MATLAB scripts to process these new data, in conjunction with 
various other data available directly in the auditors’ spreadsheets, in order to answer 
a number of research questions. These research questions are summarised in Table 1, 
along with brief notes on how we addressed the questions computationally.
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3  Results
3.1  Non‑compliance frequency
3.1.1  Most frequent non‑compliances
The most prevalent social non-compliances, analysed separately for individual farms and farm 
groups, are presented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. The most prevalent management non-
compliances, also analysed separately for individual farms and farm groups, are presented in 
Tables 4 and 5, respectively.
The “weighted occurrence” listed in each of these four tables is computed as follows:
Thus, as with all other analyses where we combine information on major (50–99%) and 
minor (0–49%) non-compliances, we attach twice as much weight to a major non-compliance 
as we do to a minor non-compliance. So, for example, four minor non-compliances would 
contribute the same to the total weighted occurrence as two major non-compliances.
The “relative frequency” listed in each of these four tables is computed as follows:
Weighted occurrence = 1 × (# of major non-compliances) +
1
2
× (# of minor non-compliances).
Table 2  The five most frequent social non-compliances for individual farms, from 2006 to 2014





6.6 Human hygiene and protective equipment 46 180 136 100.0
5.18 Educating workers and families on conserva-
tion, health, hygiene, and RA
16 124 78 57.4
6.14 Protecting workers applying agrochemicals 37 80 77 56.6
5.15 Potable water that adheres to WHO’s critical 
parameters
23 68 57 41.9
5.7 Voluntary overtime conforms to labour laws 24 64 56 41.2
Table 3  The five most frequent social non-compliances for group farms, from 2008 to 2014





6.6 Human hygiene and protective equipment 12 33 28.5 100.0
7.5 Collaborate with local environmental educa-
tion
10 17 18.5 64.9
5.18 Educating workers and families on conserva-
tion, health, hygiene, and RA
4 27 17.5 61.4
6.14 Protecting workers applying agrochemicals 6 21 16.5 57.9
5.15 Potable water that adheres to WHO’s critical 
parameters
4 16 12 42.1
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Thus, if the criterion with the highest weighted occurrence (i.e. most non-compliance) 
in a given table has a weighted occurrence of 130, its relative frequency will be 100%; and 
all other criteria will be weighted relative to that one, so that a criterion with a weighted 
occurrence of 65, say, will have a relative frequency of 50%. We present these relative fre-
quencies for ease of comparing non-compliances across tables, even when different num-
bers of audits are involved (since, for example, there are far more data spanning more years 
for individual farms than for farm groups).
3.1.2  Average compliance: individual versus farm groups
In Table 6 we present weighted occurrence scores (as defined in Sect. 3.1.1) for manage-
ment and social non-compliances, averaged over all farms, though with the averaging per-
formed separately for individual farms and group farms.
The data may be interpreted as follows. Based on the SAN-RA criteria chosen for our 
analysis (as per Sect.  2.1 and detailed in “Appendix”), the maximum possible weighted 
social non-compliance score for any audit was 21.5; the corresponding weighted maximum 
for management non-compliance was 12.5. Each individual farm had a weighted average 
of 2.93 management non-compliances flagged per audit (where a minor non-compliance 
counts 0.5 points vs. 1 point for a major non-compliance), while farm groups had an aver-
age of 3.29 management non-compliances flagged per audit. Similarly, each individual 
farm had, on average, 2.14 social non-compliances flagged per audit, while farm groups 
had an average of 2.21 social non-compliances flagged per audit.
Superficially, then, it would mean that farm groups perform marginally worse in terms 
of both social and management compliance, when compared to individual farms. However, 
it is important to perform statistical tests to ascertain whether there is a statistically signifi-
cant difference between these mean scores.
An unpaired two-sample t test indicated, however, that there was no statistically signifi-
cant difference in the levels of either management (p = 0.20) or social (p = 0.76) compli-
ance; note that the p values we quote here and hereafter are all two-tailed p values. This 
means that the observed data are consistent with a null hypothesis of equal compliance 
between individual and group farms.
Relative frequency, for one criterion’s non - compliance (%)
=
Weighted occurence (for that criterion)
Highest weighted occurence (for all criteria)
× 100%.
Table 6  Weighted occurrence scores (as defined in Sect.  3.1.1) for management and social non-compli-
ances, averaged over all farms, though with the averaging performed separately for individual farms and 
group farms
Non-compliance category Individual/group Average score (± std.) Number 
of audits
Management Individual 2.93 (± 2.10) 367
Management Group 3.29 (± 2.19) 68
Social Individual 2.14 (± 1.66) 367
Social Group 2.21 (± 1.63) 68
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3.2  Social and management correlations
Having looked at social and management non-compliances separately, we next turned to 
the question of how the two might be related. In other words—did farms that performed 
better in terms of social performance compliance also fare better in terms of manage-
ment compliance? In order to answer this question, we calculated the coefficients of 
(linear) correlation between weighted social non-compliance scores and weighted man-
agement non-compliance scores. As for all our analyses, we performed this calculation 
for both the individual farms’ and farm groups’ datasets. We also performed the afore-
said correlation analysis using two different approaches, where:
1. we treated the result from one audit (for one farm, in 1 year) as one data point in our 
correlation analysis; and
2. where we first averaged all audits over all years for a given farm, to form a single data 
point in the analysis.
Approach (1) had the advantage of giving us more data points in the correlation anal-
ysis, whereas approach (2) had the advantage of aggregating all available data for a 
given farm, which meant we could “average out” possible fluctuations due to, for exam-
ple, one farm having different auditors from year to year.
In Fig.  1 we illustrate the results of the analysis using approach (1); we plot the 
results of 367 audits for individual farms and 68 audits for farm groups. In both the indi-
vidual and group cases, we see that there is a positive linear correlation between social 
non-compliance and management non-compliance. This means that on average, in audits 
where management compliance was better, social compliance was also (on average) 
better; conversely, where management compliance was worse, social compliance was 
Fig. 1  Management versus social non-compliance scores, for both individual farms (left panel) and group 
farms (right panel)—where each dot represents a single audit in a single year. The solid lines indicate best-
fit linear models, while the dotted lines indicate 90% confidence intervals, such that approximately 90% 
of data points lie within these bounds. The colours combine social and management compliance and are 
included here for easy visual identification of, for example, regions of the plots corresponding to the most 
compliant (blue dots) and less compliant (red dots) audit results
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generally also worse. The coefficients of linear correlation (Pearson product–moment 
correlation coefficients) we calculated were 58% in the case of individual farms and 
65% in the case of farm groups. These correlations were found to be highly statistically 
significant (p ≪ 0.001) in both cases.
In Fig. 2 we illustrate the results of the analysis using approach (2); we plot the aggre-
gated scores for 80 individual farms and 23 farm groups. Again, in both the individual and 
group cases, we see that there is a positive linear correlation between social compliance 
and management compliance. The coefficients of linear correlation we calculated were 
65% in the case of individual farms and 81% in the case of farm groups. Again, these cor-
relations were found to be highly statistically significant (p ≪ 0.001) in both cases.
The apparent increase in the strength of the correlation between management and social 
compliance when we aggregated all available audit data for a single farm or farm group 
supported our hypothesis that approach (2) allowed us to iron out “noise” in the audit data 
that might be attributable to auditor subjectivity (e.g. in assigning whether a non-compli-
ance was major or minor), different auditors being used from year to year, etc. In any case, 
our analysis revealed that higher management compliance and higher social compliance 
generally go hand in hand.
It is worth noting that although the social–management correlation appears superfi-
cially to be stronger for group farms than for individual farms, statistical testing (using 
the Fisher r-to-z transformation) to compare the correlation coefficients obtained with both 
approaches (1) and (2) revealed that there isn’t strong evidence to support there being a dif-
ference between the social–management correlation for individual farms and farm groups; 
for approach (1) we calculated p = 0.36, and p = 0.10 for approach (2). In other words, 
given our data, there is no evidence to suggest that the social–management correlation 
(“better management compliance is associated with better social compliance”) is different 
for individual farms than farm groups.
Fig. 2  Management versus social non-compliance scores, for both individual farms (left panel) and group 
farms (right panel)—where one dot represents the aggregated data (over all years) for one farm, or farm 
group. The solid lines indicate best-fit linear models, while the dotted lines indicate 90% confidence inter-
vals such that approximately 90% of data points lie within these bounds. The colouring is as per Fig. 1
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3.3  Farm size versus compliance
In the previous section, we presented the results of an analysis where we correlated social 
and management compliance scores with each other. We present now a similar analysis, in 
which we correlated the data we had available concerning individual farm areas with other 
available variables. We only performed this analysis for individual farms, due to lack of 
comparable, quality data on the size of each farm seeking certification in a group.
We had three area variables (total area, production area, and conserved area) to correlate 
with three other variables (aggregate performance scores, social non-compliance scores, 
and management non-compliance scores—where the latter two scores are the same scores 
that appear in Figs. 1 and 2), giving us a total of nine correlation coefficients of interest 
(note that all the area variables will be correlated with each other as well—since produc-
tion area and conserved area add together to give total area—but these correlations are 
trivial, and of little interest to this study).
We found that the production area variable was in all cases more strongly correlated 
with the non-area variables than was either total area or protected area; as we discuss in 
Sect. 4.3, this finding is consistent with the way in which farmers must adhere to Brazil’s 
national Forest Code, as well as the agronomical fact that coffee is grown in higher alti-
tudes, where some of the land is steep and thus not suitable for coffee cultivation. Accord-
ingly, we present only the correlation coefficients for production area correlated with the 
non-area variables. These results are presented in Table 7.
The data in Table 7 may be interpreted as follows. There exists a statistically signifi-
cant negative correlation between production area and social non-compliance score. Thus, 
larger farms (that is farms with larger production areas) comply—on average—slightly 
more in terms of social performance criteria. Equivalently, smaller farms comply—on 
average—slightly less in terms of social performance indicators. There is also some evi-
dence to suggest that larger farms may comply more in terms of management criteria, 
although this correlation between farm size and management compliance is not statistically 
significant (a larger sample size might in future permit more robust conclusions about the 
apparent correlation).
3.4  Changes over time
For the 80 individual farms in our study, the median year of first audit was 2009, and our 
dataset contained an average of 4.6 years of audits per farm. Only four out of the 80 indi-
vidual farms had any gaps in their audits, i.e. a year between the first recorded audit and the 
last recorded audit in which the farm was not audited; and in all three cases, there was only 
a single gap of 1 year without audit. The remaining 76 individual farms were audited every 
single year after their year of first audit.
Table 7  Pearson correlation 
coefficients between production 
area, management non-
compliance score, and social 
non-compliance score
Production area correlated with… Correlation coef-
ficient (%)
p value
Management non-compliance score − 17 0.14
Social non-compliance score − 24 0.03
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For the 23 farm groups, in our study the median year of first audit was 2011, and the 
dataset contained an average of 3.0  years of audits per farm. Three out of the 23 farm 
groups had a gap of a single year in their audits; the remaining 19 farm groups were audited 
every single year after their year of first audit.
In order to study whether farms’ social and management compliance generally 
improved or deteriorated from year to year, we computed the difference in management 
compliance scores between consecutive audits. To take into account the fact that audits 
very occasionally did not happen in consecutive years, we normalised the difference by 
the number of years between the audits:
Thus, for example, if a farm’s social compliance (measured by weighted occurrence 
of major and minor non-compliances) improved by 3 points between 2006 and 2007, the 
improvement would be computed as 3 points/year. If another farm’s management com-
pliance decreased by 4 points between 2012 and 2014 (with no data being available for 
2013), the “improvement” would be computed as − 2 points/year, with the negative sign 
indicating a deterioration rather than improvement.
We plot the results of this analysis in Fig. 3. For both social and management compli-
ance, and for both individual farms and farm groups, it is apparent that both improve-
ments and deteriorations in compliance are observed. On the whole, though, the average 
change is positive, i.e. on average, a farm is more likely to become more compliant (on 
both social and management levels) over time.
Improvement (year X → year Y) =
compliance (year Y) − compliance (year X)
Y − X
.
Fig. 3  Histogram of improvements from year to year, where we take the one audit in 1 year to represent one 
data point (as in Fig. 1). Clockwise from top left, the average improvements are: + 0.25/year, + 0.19/year, 
+ 0.71/year, and + 0.74/year
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For audits of individual farms, the average improvements/year were + 0.25/year, 
and + 0.19/year, for social and management compliance, respectively. For farm groups, 
these averages were + 0.71/year and + 0.74/year, respectively. Unfortunately, though, 
the first two improvements were found to be statistically equivalent to 0, while the latter 
two were significant only at the 10% level (p < 0.1). In future, analysis of more available 
data should help us draw more definitive conclusions.
As in Sect.  3.2, we also performed an analysis where we aggregated all the years of 
available data for a given farm or farm group, such that a single data point in our analysis 
was taken to be the average of all the yearly improvements for that farm or farm group. As 
before, adopting this approach allowed us to iron out “noise” in the audit data that might be 
attributable to auditor subjectivity, as well as to make more a straightforward interpretation 
about whether a single entity (farm or farm group) was likely to improve or deteriorate over 
time.
The results of this analysis are presented in Fig. 4. For individual farms, the average 
yearly improvements were + 0.36/year and + 0.23/year, for social and management compli-
ance, respectively. For farm groups, these averages are + 0.87/year and + 1.16/year, respec-
tively. Only the latter two improvements were found to be statistically significantly differ-
ent from 0 (at the 10% significance level). Once again, the availability of more data might 
help us draw more definitive conclusions in future.
Because all of these averages are positive, the interpretation is that more farms and farm 
groups improved over time, in terms of both social and management compliance (although 
there were some farms and farm groups that deteriorated and some that remained more or 
less unchanged over time). However, given that some of the improvements were statisti-
cally equivalent to zero, a more accurate interpretation would be that farm compliance did 
not decline over time.
Fig. 4  Histogram of improvements from year to year, where we take the aggregated year-to-year changes 
for a single farm or farm group to represent one data point (as in Fig. 2). Clockwise from top left, the aver-
age improvements are: + 0.36/year, + 0.23/year, + 0.87/year, and + 1.16/year
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It is worth noting that the average year-on-year changes were always higher (by a fac-
tor of a few) for farm groups than for individual farms and that the individual farms’ 
improvements were not even statistically significant. For example, the average farm group 
improved management compliance by 1.16 points/year, whereas this average was only 
0.23 points/year for individual farms. This finding can be combined with the findings in 
Sect. 3.1: though farm groups generally start off at a “lower baseline” (lower social compli-
ance, lower management compliance) than individual farms, their compliance appears to 
improve more rapidly than individual farms’ compliance. We discuss possible reasons for 
this phenomenon in Sect. 4.4.
Finally, we mention briefly that as an alternative to the above analysis, we ran a lin-
ear regression analysis, i.e. we fitted management and social compliance scores as a linear 
function of time (year), for both individual and group farms, using ordinary least squares 
estimators for the slope and intercept parameters in the fitted models. Consistent with the 
above findings, we found that the slope (corresponding to average change in scores over 
time) had a positive value significantly different from 0 (at a 10%) level only in the case of 
group farms, for both management and social compliance. The fitted slopes for the indi-
vidual farms were positive, but statistically equivalent to 0.
4  Discussion
4.1  Non‑compliance frequency
The five most frequent non-compliances were the same, and in the same order, for both 
individual- and group-certified coffee farms. It is noteworthy that these five management 
non-compliances (relating to management systems, ecological pest control, continual 
improvement, socio-environmental systems, and labour payment) appeared in the same 
order across the two broad profile types of individual and group certifications; given the 
implausibility of this being a random coincidence, these non-compliances may point to 
areas in need of particular attention when assisting farms to prepare for initial certification, 
or indeed to improve their certification performance over time.
In terms of social performance-based criteria, both group and individual farms most fre-
quently fail to comply with four out of the same five social criteria. The most frequent non-
compliance for both group and individual farms was with criterion 6.6, which focuses on 
human hygiene facilities and the provision of protective equipment. In Brazil, the laws on 
human hygiene (Codex Alimentarius 2003) and protective equipment in the workplace and 
on farms are very stringent (da Cunha et al. 2014; Rodrigues 2015, pers. comm.). Granted 
that criterion 6.6 proved difficult to comply with, we suggest that the SAN scheme (via its 
auditors or information documentation) could offer technical assistance to farmers to help 
them meet this requirement.
The above similarities between group and individual farms for both management and 
social performance criteria were consistent with the findings of Pinto et al. (2014). These 
similarities between group and individual farm also demonstrate group certification’s 
social-levelling potential since resource-poor farmers with smaller holdings performed 
very similarly to larger individual farms with larger revenues despite having to surmount 
financial, administrative, and other obstacles to undergo certification.
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4.2  Social and management correlations
Over 9 years of audit data for the SAN/RA certificate, we found that there was a statis-
tically significant, positive linear correlation between the two types of non-compliance 
scores for both individual and group farms. We found that farms that performed better in 
terms of social compliance also fared better in terms of management compliance, which 
suggests that management and social criteria could be mutually supportive. The positive 
correlation between social compliance and management compliance was stronger for group 
farms.
However, correlation does not imply causation, and the existence of a correlation across 
a large sample of Brazilian coffee farms does not, by itself, imply a causal relationship. A 
causal relationship between good management and good social performance is certainly 
plausible; it would be compatible with established relationships between management and 
performance outcomes in other certified sectors (Samson and Terziovski 1999; Singels 
et al. 2001; Melnyk et al. 2003); and in the case of our data, the association (correlation) is 
strong. As such, a number of the Bradford Hill criteria for causality would be satisfied (Hill 
1965). Nevertheless, further work is required to study more closely the temporality of pos-
sible cause and effect (cause should precede effect)—something that would likely require 
a greater quantity and breadth of audit data than existed at the time of this study—as well 
as, importantly, to rule out other possible explanations for the correlation. Since the group 
and individual samples are unmatched, there may be one or more unobserved geographic 
or socio-economic variables that could explain the observed differences.
4.3  Farm size versus compliance
The stratification of producer types between producers that seek certification individu-
ally and those in groups is one clear dichotomy that reveals a difference at the farm level. 
Beyond this binary division of producer profiles, we examined how farm size affected 
compliance to the SAN standard. The size of production area was considered, since it is 
a reflection on the earnings from coffee and can highlight issues of socio-economic equity 
in certification. Rather than choosing another descriptive delineation like the number of 
members in a group, or the total area of a farm holding, we considered the size of the 
production area as a proxy for asymmetries and inequalities in resources. Similarly, Pinto 
et al.’s (2014) study of all coffee farms SAN-RA audited in Brazil in 2011 showed that the 
majority of individually certified farms are large (> 450 ha, 73%). The same study showed, 
by contrast, that group-certified farms are mostly small (31–120  ha, 35%), medium 
(121–450 ha, 35%), or mini (< 30 ha, 15%).
We showed that there exists a statistically significant, negative correlation between 
production area and social non-compliance score. Thus, larger farms performed—on 
average—slightly better in terms of social compliance. Equivalently, smaller farms per-
formed—on average—slightly worse in terms of social compliance. There was also some 
evidence to suggest that larger farms performed better in terms of management compli-
ance, but more data could be required to determine whether this correlation is statistically 
significant. These results are consistent with the broader literature discussed in this arti-
cle’s introduction, which finds that smallholders have greater difficulty in meeting certi-
fication requirements since compliance “requires significant capital investment” (Winters 
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et al. 2015; p. 597). As before, we draw conclusions here only about correlations; pinpoint-
ing the cause(s) of the higher compliance observed for larger farms would require further 
research.
4.4  Changes over time
Beyond looking at the sustainability of operations at two time points—e.g. before and after 
certification’s auditing process (Newsom et  al. 2006)—our study analysed compliance 
across multiple time points, across 9 years of auditing performance. We found a year-on-
year increasing compliance to certification standards. For SAN-certified Brazilian coffee, 
both farms and farm groups improved over time, in terms of both social and management 
compliance. These year-on-year improvements were set against a backdrop of the SAN cer-
tificate becoming harder to attain and maintain with more critical criteria and new rules.
Certification standards change over time, as they respond to changes in the sector, incor-
porate new information, or sometimes, compete with other standards for legitimacy and pre-
dominance in the marketplace (Cashore et al. 2004). The SAN standard changed with new 
rules, new thematic issues, and new foci. Furthermore, farmers must adhere to a manda-
tory continuous improvement plan whereby all non-compliances must be eliminated within 
a two-year period, or within a period agreed with the certification team (IMAFLORA 2005, 
2008). As such, one could infer that farms and farm groups who engage with the SAN/RA 
certification system become more engaged with sustainable agriculture methods.
Average improvements were always significantly greater for farm groups than for indi-
vidual farms. At the same time, farm groups started at a lower baseline (i.e. lower social 
compliance, lower management compliance) than individual farms. Group farms also 
undergo a more difficult audit process. Beyond having to comply with at least 80% of the 
SAN/RA criteria as individual farms must, groups must also comply with an additional 
“Group Certification Standard” and must appoint a group auditor to conduct internal audits 
(SAN 2011b). Despite these extra requirements, group farms’ compliance levels were no 
worse than those of individual farms.
Despite our cautiously optimistic appraisal of changes in compliance over time, we 
emphasise that the inferred improvements (or in the case of individual farms, lack of deteri-
oration) were, in substantive terms, rather modest. But again all improvements, whether by 
group or individually certified farms, are made within a certification system that becomes 
more difficult to acquire year after year. The lack of deterioration over time is reassur-
ing, especially since farms that undergo certification generally were previously commit-
ted to environmental and social issues before the certification process (COSA 2014; Hardt 
et al. 2015). Improvement despite increasing difficulty would suggest that those farms that 
undergo the SAN audit learn about sustainable management of their farms as well as how 
to achieve (socially sustainable) outcomes.
The improvements over time also allow us to address some concerns regarding selec-
tion bias, a concern raised, inter alia, by Blackman and Rivera 2011; Rueda and Lambin 
2013; Tscharntke et al. 2015; Tayleur et al. 2017; and DeFries et al. 2017. Even if it hap-
pened to be true (though we have no data to support this hypothesis) that the individual 
farms applying for certification were already farming in a way where they were able to 
comply with certification’s sustainability demands, this would not in itself be an indictment 
of the certification scheme. On the contrary, our results show that certified farms (whether 
or not their farming practices were sustainable ab initio) actually, on average, improved at 
each audit while participating in the certification scheme, which is a positive and indeed 
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unanticipated outcome. The results from the farm groups are even more noteworthy: they 
bear testimony to smallholders (who likely would not otherwise have had access to the cer-
tification process for financial or administrative reasons, or even due to illiteracy and innu-
meracy) starting from a relatively low compliance baseline and improving steadily over 
time, while benefiting from sustainable agriculture knowledge gained during certification. 
Also, since farmer uptake of the SAN/RA standard increases each year, Rainforest Alliance 
Certified™ coffee is no longer niche but mainstream (Potts et al. 2014; Tayleur et al. 2017), 
and landscape-level social equity is improving; with the increasing mainstreaming of SAN/
RA certification, any concern that those electing for certification are a very narrow, unrep-
resentative sample of farmers becomes less tenable.2
The changes in compliance across 9 years of Brazilian SAN coffee audits in our analy-
ses are consistent with Bakker’s (2014) study on group certification, which found that cer-
tified smallholders and group farms perceived an improvement in their social well-being, 
particularly in the form of increased knowledge in agricultural practices, health, and occu-
pational hazards.
The improvements in compliance to the SAN standard indicate sustainable outcomes 
as per the stipulation of each criterion. But there are also sustainable improvements that 
go beyond those stipulated in the standards. Locke et al. (2007) found that producers who 
underwent the audit process had to invest heavily in training for better labour conditions 
which then had a positive effect on their staff and also on their suppliers. This wider impact 
of certification’s sustainable improvements is consistent with the Frenkle and Scott (2002) 
study on improved working conditions after adhering to a code of conduct.
5  Conclusions
5.1  Summary of findings
Environmental and social certification is expanding rapidly across numerous commodities, 
making it important to understand what certification delivers in terms of social sustain-
ability and equity outcomes. This paper presented a quantitative analysis of a large dataset 
to chart the evolution of compliance with certification standards over time and over a large 
number of farm profiles.
In this paper’s analysis, we drew on the example of Brazil’s SAN-certified coffee sec-
tor to provide a comprehensive account of the role of management and social criteria in 
improving on-farm social sustainability. Although one might expect that the small-scale 
farms comprising farm groups could be disadvantaged (due to economies of scale), we 
found that when these small-scale farms were certified in groups, they were able to comply 
with SAN’s management and social performance requirements to become certified. Indeed, 
farms seeking certification as a group were found to exhibit levels of compliance with both 
2 Various statistical methods exist that attempt to account for self-selection bias, such as pair matching 
(Rueda and Lambin 2013) or propensity score matching (PSM; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Arnould 
et al. 2009; van Rijsbergen et al. 2016; Jena et al. 2017). PSM’s merits have been discussed in reviews by 
Tscharntke et al. 2015; Tayleur et al. 2017; and DeFries et al. 2017; however, we could not use PSM in our 
analysis as we lacked data on farmers who did not apply for certification, as well as ancillary data on those 
who did. Future research should be designed with issues of self-selection bias in mind to ascertain whether 
positive sustainability outcomes are attributable to certification, as opposed to merely being associated with 
it.
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management and social performance requirements on par with the compliance levels of 
individual farms. Our findings suggested that adopting certification’s management systems 
on farms contributes to positive social outcomes, and this was the case for diverse farm 
profiles (large, medium, and small farms; individual and group farms).
Strikingly, the most frequent non-compliances for management criteria were identical 
and in the same order of frequency for both group and individual farms. Moreover, the 
most common non-compliances for social performance criteria were also identical, albeit 
in slightly different order of frequency, for both group and individual farms. From these 
results, one could infer that the group certification tool has had some success in delivering 
social equity between these two farm profiles, not least because group certification pro-
vided a means for small-scale farms to access certification in the first place.
Our findings indicate that adopting certification’s management systems on farms is 
associated with positive social outcomes for diverse farmer profiles. Achieving landscape-
level equity across one agricultural commodity requires that diverse profiles of farmers are 
able to manage their workers and farm operations to deliver social sustainability criteria 
as required by standards, such as that of the SAN standard. Because the analysis explored 
diverse farmer profiles by aggregating on-farm audit data that spanned all the coffee farms 
that had sought SAN certification across Brazil (up to 2014), we were also able to make 
some inferences about social equity at the landscape level, particularly via the social-level-
ling tool of group certification.
Whereas some certification schemes are weighted heavily in favour of either procedural 
or performance criteria, the SAN standard combines both procedural (management) and 
performance (in this analysis, social performance) criteria. Given our findings regarding 
the correlation between procedural (management) and performance criteria, we conclude 
that certification standards that balance both types of criteria appear important in deliver-
ing sustainability outcomes and in helping smallholders meet certification standards. Simi-
larly, other agricultural policies could be informed by SAN certification and be designed to 
foster management systems that are associated with improved social sustainability.
5.2  Limitations of this study
It is also critical to acknowledge the limitations of this study. For instance, our data came 
from a single auditing and certification mechanism—the SAN standard. However, we believe 
our findings are relevant to a significant segment of coffee producers worldwide since around 
one-third of global coffee beans are Brazilian (Potts et al. 2014) and also around one-third of 
global coffee is certified (ibid.). The relevance of the research we present extends beyond the 
coffee sector. There has been a proliferation of standards in many industries. Among agricul-
tural products, coffee certification is the most widespread and most mature, thus offering an 
example for other sectors to emulate (Panhuysen and Pierrot 2014).
At several points we presented various statistically significant correlations; we empha-
sised, though, that while causal links are plausible between some of the variables in question 
(e.g. adherence to management criteria leading to improved social outcomes), further work is 
required to demonstrate causality. Similarly, where differences between individual and group 
farms were observed, we could not make any deductions about the causes of those differ-
ences: to do so would require further study of unmeasured, though possibly relevant, vari-
ables that could explain these differences. The common methods used to analyse unbalanced 
panel datasets (see, for example, Finkel 1995), popular though they may be, would still not 
have permitted unequivocal identification of causal relationships within our data.
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Another key limitation of our analysis is that it was conducted through the lens of the 
SAN standard, focused on social criteria as per the definitions contained in those standards. 
There are some social issues the standard does not cover; for instance, the SAN standard 
does not require a living wage, a contentious and fiercely debated issue in Brazil’s labour 
and welfare arena. Likewise, the issue of women’s voice and participation in coffee cul-
tivation is given limited coverage: only one SAN criterion currently addresses this in the 
form of a clause on non-discrimination (SAN 2011a, p. 24, criterion 5.2). On the other 
hand, given the relatively comprehensive scope and widely regarded stringency of the SAN 
standard’s criteria that are oriented towards social equity (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005; 
Raynolds et al. 2007; Newton et al. 2013; see also “Appendix”), along with our generally 
positive findings regarding compliance from a diversity of farms through many years of 
audits, we may infer that a degree of social equity has been achieved.
With these limitations in mind, the research we have presented here does nevertheless 
represent a novel analysis of a large certification dataset and lays foundations for future 
research. The analytical methods we used could be applied more generally to other certifi-
cation datasets across a wide range of sectors.
5.3  Future work
One could envisage extending this study with a complementary evaluation of the impacts 
of SAN certification; such a study might make use of interviews with farmers, probing 
social equity issues broader than those currently contained in the standard as per Barbosa 
de Lima et al.’s (2009) impact assessment (see chapter 4 on SAN-certified coffee in Bra-
zil). While audit data may indicate an improvement in compliance or move towards social 
equity, interview data could elucidate the causal mechanisms driving such changes in the 
first place. IMAFLORA auditors do conduct interviewers with farm workers as part of 
their audits—used in part to assess compliance with certain criteria—but notes from these 
interviews were not available for this analysis, nor were they expected to be standardised 
for cross-farm comparison. Farmer confidentiality may also be an issue. Nevertheless, such 
holistic analyses could contribute to improvements in the SAN standard and other certifica-
tion schemes. In the shorter term, the authors hope to present a similar analysis of the SAN 
standard to the one in this paper, but this time focused on environmental rather than social 
outcomes.
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Appendix
SAN’s stated mission is to promote the environmental and social sustainability of agricul-
tural activities through the development of good practices, certification, and the training of 
rural producers. The criteria, with which companies and farms attempt to comply, cover 
ten principles on the following areas:
 1. Social and environmental management system
 2. Ecosystem conservation
 3. Wildlife protection
 4. Water conservation
 5. Fair treatment and good working conditions for workers
Table 8  List of SAN’s management criteria. Critical criteria (sine qua nons for certification) are indicated 
in boldface
Code Criterion description
1.1 Strict socio-environmental management system in place to comply with SAN and national legisla-
tion
1.2 Management system with short-, medium-, and long-term objectives, timelines, and procedures
1.3 Upper managers must be committed to the SAN system
1.4 The socio-environmental management system’s objectives must be available to all workers
1.5 All documents and records must be kept for at least three years and be readily available
1.6 New works or activities must be subjected to a social and environmental impact assessment
1.7 Continual improvement plan that includes corrective actions to rectify non-compliances
1.8 Suppliers and contractors must comply with SAN’s social, labour, and environmental requirements
1.9 Training must be implemented to guarantee socio-environmental management system is enacted
2.1 Aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems must be protected and restored through a conservation 
programme
2.9 Implement a plan to restore or maintain connectivity of natural ecosystems
4.1 Water conservation programme with inventory and detailed water source map
4.6 A wastewater and water quality monitoring and analysis programme must be established with lab 
results
5.1 Farm’s upper management must approve policy on workers’ rights—then make available to farm 
workforce
5.4 Comprehensive labour payment policies with thorough explanations of the salary paid
6.1 Occupational health and safety programme and committee must be established to minimise workers’ 
risks
6.2 Continuous training on working safely—written procedure and training sessions must be recorded.
6.18 Potential emergencies must be identified and an emergency response plan for all workers must be 
drafted
7.2 Identify farm’s potential local impact—all locals’ comments and replies must be publically 
viewable
8.1 Ecological control of pests and detailed pest infestation records
9.1 Soil erosion prevention and control programme must be executed
9.2 Soil or crop fertilisation programme must be executed and soil analyses results must be kept
10.1 Integrated waste management programme must be executed with waste weights and volumes esti-
mated
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Table 9  List of SAN’s social criteria. Critical criteria (sine qua nons for certification) are indicated in bold-
face
Code Criterion description
5.2 Equal pay and no discrimination in hiring as indicated by ILO Conventions 100 and 111
5.3 Farm must directly hire workers—any labour contractor must adhere to social standards as SAN’s
5.5 Wages ≥ legally established minimum wage
5.6 Working hours, rest periods, paid annual vacation days, etc., must comply with current labour laws
5.7 Overtime hours that are both voluntary and conform to labour laws
5.8 No worker must be under 15 years old. Records must be kept on minors aged 15-17.
5.10 Continual improvement plan that includes corrective actions to rectify non-compliances
5.11 Zero abuse and harassment with formal mechanisms to act upon any staff mistreatment
5.12 Workers may freely organise and negotiate working conditions as per ILO Conventions 87 & 88
5.13 Permanent and seasonal workers must be informed of farm changes with socio-environmental impact
5.14 Staff housing provided must be hygienic, safe, well-maintained and meet several other characteristics
5.15 Provide farm workers access to potable water that adheres to the WHO’s critical parameters
5.16 Workers and families must have access to medical services during working hours and in an emer-
gency
5.17 School-age children on the farm must have access to education that complies with national require-
ments
5.18 Educating workers and families on conservation, health, hygiene, and Rainforest Alliance
6.3 Workers handling or transporting agrochemicals must be trained in the criterion’s 8 chemical safety 
areas
6.4 Workers carrying out activities with any health risk must receive an annual check up at least annually
6.5 Only males aged 18 to 60 can apply agrochemicals and must undergo medical examinations first
6.6 Human hygiene, protective equipment, and basic services must be provided by the farm to workers
6.7 Strict safety standards and an inventory of hazardous materials must be maintained to reduce acci-
dents
6.8 Workshops and stores should be designed to reduce accidents to workers and to the environment
6.9 Agrochemical stores should be designed to reduce accidents to workers and to the environment
6.10 Farm must store an amount of agrochemicals necessary for short-term needs and safely separate them
6.11 Separations between agrochemical and fuel storages areas as well as from other risky areas
6.12 Measures must be taken to reduce agrochemical spills
6.13 All workers who come into contact with agrochemicals must use personal protection equip-
ment
6.14 The farm must protect workers applying agrochemicals and a supervisor must check them every 3 
hours
6.15 The farm must take permanent actions to protect others from the effects of agrochemical applications
6.16 The farm must have changing rooms and showers for those who come into contact with agrochemi-
cals
6.17 Clothes worn while applying agrochemicals must never be washed in the workers’ homes
6.19 The farm must have access to all the necessary equipment identified in the emergency response plan
7.1 Land and activities that are socially, culturally, biologically, and environmentally important to the 
community must be respected
7.3 Recruitment, training, and supplier policies should prioritise local labour and local suppliers
7.4 Community natural resources should be protected and the farm must develop the local economy
7.5 Collaborate with local environmental education
7.6 Land use and tenure must be legal with appropriate official documentations as proof
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 6. Occupational health and safety
 7. Community relations
 8. Integrated crop management
 9. Soil management and conservation
 10. Integrated waste management.
Table 8 details the criteria of the SAN standard which are procedural in nature, requir-
ing certain management, procedures, and documentations to be put in place. The right-
hand column is the SAN two-tier code, and the left-hand column is a short summary of 
each criterion.
Table 9 details the criteria of the SAN standard which require certain social outcomes 
to be performed; throughout in this paper we have labelled these criteria as “social”. As 
before, the right-hand column is the SAN two-tier code, and the left-hand column is a short 
summary of each criterion.
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